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I. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This chapter will provide a brief background of the Unified Transportation 
Command (USTRANSCOM) component command, the Military Sealift Command 
(MSC), followed by a discussion ofMSC's organization and funding as it pertains 
to the Special Mission Ships program area. Lastly, a problem statement is 
presented concerning the pros and cons of decentralizing the responsibility for 
operating special mission ships. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The United States Transportation Command is the unified command 
responsible for the strategic transportation of troops and equipment for the 
Department of Defense (DoD). USTRANSCOM is the focal point for establishing 
and maintaining a national Defense Transportation System. USTRANSCOM has 
three component commands: Air Force Air Mobility Command (AMC), Army 
Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), and Navy Military Sealift 
Command (MSC). 
MSC is delegated the operational control of sealift transportation services 
for all of the armed services using military and commercial transportation modes. 
MSC has three mission areas: Strategic Sealift, Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force 
(NF AF), and Special Mission Support Force. [Ref. 1] 
Currently, MSC is undergoing a re-engineering effort that emphasizes 
improving customer satisfaction. The reinvention effort has reorganized the 
management structure from functional area directorates to a program management 
structure based on major service lines. This new structure is designed to enhance 
customer satisfaction by establishing a mission oriented team which serves all the 
customer functional needs. In effect it will provide the cohesiveness of program 
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owner-ship by the MSC employees and, in addition, add visibility to cost and 
resource allocations. 
B. THE A-76 PROGRAM 
It is widely accepted that competition results in improved quality and 
reduced costs. It is also believed that in many cases the federal government 
operates inefficiently due to the lack of competition for producing goods and 
services. The A-76 program was embraced by the Reagan Administration as a 
means to promote efficiency and reduce costs in the government by having 
government agencies compete with commercial activities for contracts. 
Competition was intended to create an incentive for government operations to 
optimize their productivity. 
1. 1983 OMB A-76 Supplemental Handbook 
OMB Circular No. A-76, "Performance of Commercial Activities," was first 
issued in 1966 and revised in 1967, 1979, and 1983. The basis of the circular is 
the belief that the federal government is too large and expensive, and that it is in 
the best interest of the economy for the government to use commercial goods and 
services when they are available. The OMB A-76 Supplemental Handbook 
provides guidance and procedures for determining whether recurring commercial 
activities should be operated under contract with commercial sources or in-house 
using Government facilities and personnel [Ref. 2]. The 1983 Supplemental 
Handbook required agencies to: 
... develop an inventory of all operations that potentially could be 
performed by private contractors. Activities that were determined to 
be 'inherently governmental in nature,' that is, activities 'so 
intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance 
only by Federal employees,' were not to be contracted out.. .. The A-
76 circular established a review process to determine whether public 
or private workers could do the job more efficiently. The key, in 
concert with the competition prescription, was the creation of a 
competition between the government and contractors. [Ref. 3] 
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Figure 1 is an outline of the cost comparison methodology that the 1983 circular 
mandated agencies to follow when making in-house or out-sourcing decisions to 
achieve the "most efficient organization." The goal was to increase efficiency by 
encouraging federal agencies to contract out to private industry those activities that 
could be performed at lower costs and to provide incentives for agencies to reduce 
the cost of government operations to compete with the private sector. 
2. MSC's Implementation of the A 76 Program 
One of President Reagan's campaign promises was to privatize more Navy 
and Marine operations which would provide jobs for merchant mariners. In 1981, 
the Joint Maritime Congress contracted for a study by Booz, Allen, and Hamilton 
concerning the feasibility of civilian contract operation of government ships. The 
study concluded MSC could potentially contract out the operations of some of its 
ships. The 1983 revision of OMB circular A-76 required all federal agencies to 
determine which functions could potentially be performed by the private sector. 
The revision combined with pressure from the Seafarers International Union (SIU) 
led the Secretary of the Navy to assess the cost of out-sourcing MSC ship opera-
tions. In 1984 the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics directed the 
Commander of MSC to develop and issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) to 
implement contract manning for the special mission ships (SMSs ). The first class 
of ships to go through the RFP process was the oceanographic ships and the 
contract was awarded to Lavino Shipping Company at an estimated savings of 
$24.8 million. The range, cable, and hospital ships (at the time the hospital ships 
were under the SMS category) were all awarded in-house contracts largely due to 
a reduction in ship crew manning levels. [Ref. 4] 
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C. SPECIAL MISSION PROGRAM 
The Special Missions Program (PM-2), formerly the Special Missions Ship 
Support Force (SMSF), is one of the six new program management mission areas 
in the reorganized MSC. Currently twenty-nine ships fall under PM-2; eight 
civilian mariner operated, seventeen contractor-operated, and four chartered (The 
USNS WILKES has been turned-over to the Tunisian government as of FY95). 
The program customers include: the Naval Meteorology and Oceanographic 
Command, the Space and Naval Warfare Command (SPA WAR), the Naval Sea 
Systems Command (NAVSEA), the Air Force Technical Analysis Command 
(AFT A C), the Strategic Systems Programs (SSP), and the Commander in Chief of 
the Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT). The TAGOS and CHOUEST class ships 
were placed in the Special Mission Program in FY96 as part of the MSC re-
engineering effort. [Ref. 5] MSC's special mission ships support a combination of 
service unique non-transportation and non-fleet ship requirements from a variety 
of sponsors. The specialized military services include oceanographic and 
hydrographic surveys, undersea surveillance, acoustic research, missile telemetry 
collection and range instrumentation. The SMSs are both civilian mariner and 
contractor mariner operated. The non-ship operations, such as research, are the 
responsibility of the sponsors. MSC provides and oversees the ship operations. 
[Ref. 1] 
D. DEFENSE BUSINESS OPERATIONS FUND 
The Practical Comptrollership, Naval Postgraduate School Instruction Guide 
describes the Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) as: 
The DBOF serves as a financin~ mechanism. Those activities 
that are financed by the DBOF do not receive an annual 
appropriation. Instead, they receive unit cost eoals and earn cost 
authoritv for the amount of everv customer order accepted. As 
DBOF activities accept these orders and perform work for their 
customers, they use cash in the DBOF to pay for their costs. 
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Customers are then billed based on the stabilized rate and the 
customers reimburse the DBOF. This revolving cycle continues, 
hence the DBOF is considered a revolving fund. 
The DBOF policies include recovery of prior year losses, charging military 
personal costs using a civilian equivalency rate, and the inclusion of management 
headquarters cost in the prices charged to customers. [Ref. 6] 
1. DBOF at MSC 
MSC was funded under the Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) prior to FY 1992. 
In October 1991, transportation was established as a business area of the Defense 
Business Operation Fund (DBOF). MSC operates under DBOF in two separate 
capacities. One is as the Transportation Component Command (TCC) for sealift 
to Commander In Chief, U.S. Transportation Command; the budget for that mission 
is included in Transportation business area of the DBOF controlled by 
TRANSCOM (DBOF-T). The second major mission is as the Type Commander 
for Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for a number of service unique vessels 
(DBOF-N), such as the special mission ships (SMSs). [Ref. 7] 
One of the basic tenets of the DBOF is to define and centrally manage total 
costs of a ship, program or operation. To that end, certain costs such as headquarter 
overhead, military personnel costs and a prorated share of USTRANSCOM costs 
are included in MSC programs. SMS is a DBOF-N program, as such 
USTRANSCOM costs are not included in SMS per diem rates as they would if 
under DBOF-T. [Ref. 7] 
As part of the DBOF policy of total costing, OSD guidance regarding 
headquarter's costs changed. Whereas in FY88 to FY92, HQ costs were funded 
via a separate appropriation, and not included in MSC rates, adaptation of DBOF 
policies charged these costs to DBOF. To allow both MSC and its customers to 
properly plan and budget for this change, headquarters costs in FY 1993 were not 
included in customers rates but were funded as a direct reimbursable from Navy's 
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centralized claimancy OP-09BF (now called N09BF). Military costs, previously 
directly funded by MILPERS appropriation, are now reimbursed by MSC to 
MILPERS and these costs are included in customers' rates. [Ref. 7] 
2. MSC's Per Diem Rates 
MSC breaks customer per diem rates into two types of costs: direct costs 
and overhead expenses. The ship's sponsor pays a per diem rate for the individual 
ship and is charged for each day the ship is dedicated to that sponsor's use. MSC 
has two operating per diem rates applied to sponsors: Full Operating Status (FOS) 
and Reduced Operating Status (ROS). The per diem is a stabilized rate and any 
variance between actual and applied costs are recovered in future years. [Ref. 7] 
The Practical Comptrollership defines direct costs as those incurred directly 
for and readily identifiable to a specific output or service, a ship in this case. 
Direct costs are those which can be ascribed to the operation of a ship and include 
maintenance and repair (M&R), fuel, overhauls, and crew wages. [Ref. 8] 
MSC 's overhead includes all headquarters and shore activity costs. MSC 's 
overhead costs are pro-rated to each ship based on a percentage allocation method 
that requires best estimates by the directorates as to the time spent on each of the 
six programs and the associated endstrengths. It is referred to as rate-recoverable 
overhead. Overhead is allocated on a two tiered method, costs that are directly 
attributed to a specific program are delegated to that program (similar to indirect 
costs in private industry). The indirect costs (general and administration, ADP etc.) 
are then allocated based on the percentage of total shore personnel workyears 
dedicated to the Special Mission Program. The area commands calculate overhead 
by determining the percentage of time devoted to each program and multiplying it 
by the total rate-recoverable overhead pool. The next step is to apportion overhead 
to each individual ship as a percentage of the direct expenditures for that class of 
ship. [Ref. 7] 
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E. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
MSC 's renewed emphasis on customer satisfaction has encouraged MSC to 
analyze the need for the Special Mission Support Force Program area. Several 
factors have led SMS sponsors to raise the question of privatizing the ships' 
operations and letting the sponsors be responsible for the contracts' administration 
and management. The significant reductions in the Department of Defense (DoD) 
budget and manpower strengths, and the implementation of the DBOF rate structure 
by MSC, have placed pressure on the sponsors to look at ways to reduce the costs 
of operating their ships. The SMS customers are facing increased per diem rates 
due to DBOF's full cost recovery policy and a high degree of variance in each 
fiscal year's per diem rate. 
This thesis will attempt to evaluate whether MSC can manage the operation 
the Special Mission Ships more efficiently and effectively than the individual 
sponsors of the ships. The thesis will try to assess whether there exists economies 




The methodology applied in this study is loosely based on OMB Circular A-
94, "Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs" 
and John W. Creswell's Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches. The research data was collected through a literature search and 
review. In addition, interviews were conducted with MSC staff members, MSC 
Special Mission Ships sponsors, and other persons knowledgeable in the subject 
area addressed in the thesis. The method employed is to: 
• State the policy rationale for conducting the study. The policy 
rationale answers the question 'why' conduct the study. It states the 
justification for performing the research. In other words, the 
rationale defines the underlying reason behind the analysis and its 
significance. 
• Outline the objective of the thesis. The objective is the qualitative 
statement which captures the basis of the study and relays to the 
reader the 'central controlling idea in the study.' It sets the stage for 
the remainder of the thesis by clearly defining intent behind the 
analysis. The objective defines the course of action to be taken based 
on the purpose and, therefore, determines the boundaries of the 
research. [Ref. 9] 
• Define the problem. The most important step in a case study is to 
define the problem. First, the symptoms generated by the problem 
must be identified and the scope of the problem determined. The 
problem statement poses the questions which the thesis will attempt 
to answer or, at least, provides some insight to concerned parties. 
• Declare any assumptions made. The assumptions help define scope 
of the study and its limitations. If the assumptions in a study are not 
specified then the author has not accurately given the reader a good 
measure of the value of the information presented. All research has 
weaknesses and a narrowness in perspective and it is imperative to 
provide them. 
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• Generate and analyze alternative solutions. OMB Circular A-94 
suggests examining different program scales, different methods of 
providing the service, and varied degrees of government involvement. 
• Make recommendations and verity the alternative selected. A 
comprehensive examination of the best alternative and its relevance 
is necessary to validate the study. 
The thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter I provides a brief 
background and introduction to the thesis. It discusses the DBOF processes by 
which MSC operates, the OMB Circular A-76 privatization program and its 
influence on MSC SMS operations, and the importance of the study. Chapter II 
defines the methodology. Chapter III presents a detailed examination of the 
problems which have arisen with the Special Mission Support Force. Chapter IV 
outlines and evaluates three potential alternatives: centralization (status quo), 
decentralization (sponsors gain operational control), centralization with 
decentralized questions and other modifications. 
The following four questions will provide the focus of the study: 
1. Do any economies of scale or economies of scope exist to justifY 
centralizing the Special Mission Support Force mission? 
2. Are there any economies of scale or scope that are not being captured 
under the current system? 
3. If there are economies of scale or scope, are they being correctly 
allocated to the sponsors? 
4. What is the optimal allocation of responsibility for the operation of 
special mission ships? 
Chapter V contains the summary and recommendations. 
A. POLICY RATIONALE 
The reason for studying the Special Mission Support Force program is to: 
1) examine whether centralizing the SMS functions results in economies, 2) attempt 
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to investigate if the economies being realized, 3) analyze if giving SMS contracting 
responsibility to the sponsors would reduce total costs and, 4) determine if there 
is an inherent reason to maintain the centralized control of the SMS ships. The 
overarching goal is to optimize SMS operations under the DoD budget constraints 
without detriment to the mission. Total costs of the SMS should be minimized to 
the point closest to the sponsors' equilibrium in an attempt to equate the marginal 
costs and marginal benefits to the sponsors. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the issue of how to best allocate 
the complex and mixed responsibility for operating of special mission ships. The 
SMS program is a hybrid and does not fit into the traditional four quadrant 
public/private choices of 1) public financing and public sector delivery, 2) public 
financing and private sector delivery, 3) private financing and private delivery, and 
4) private financing and public delivery (ex. U.S. Post Office and national parks) 
[Ref. 10]. Due to the implementation of the A-76 program, the operation of 
oceanographic ships are contracted out by MSC and MSC is responsible for 
administering and managing the contracts. This adds an extra level of 'second 
party' management not traditionally seen in privatizing a government function. 
The mixture of special mission programs involving both government-owned/ 
government operated and government-owned/contractor operated ships has created 
an intricate network of responsibility. 
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The intent is to ascertain if any economies of scale or economies of scope 
are derived from centralizing control over special purpose ships and if the current 
system captures them for the appropriate commands. Also to be considered is any 
potential opportunity costs and transaction costs associated with decentralizing the 
program. 
C. DEFINITIONS 
For the purpose of this thesis: 
Economies of Scale. Eitan A. A vneyon' s Dictionary of Finance defines 
economies of scale as the decrease in average production costs owing to the 
enlargement of the enterprise and increase of output. The economies of 
scale are achieved because fixed costs do not rise proportionally, and are 
absorbed by a larger output and by specialization, or by the use of 
production processes with a lower variable cost per unit. Usually such 
processes have an optimal, minimum cost level, beyond which efficiency 
decreases, whether due to management capacity limitations, lack of flexi-
bility, or vast investment costs, etc. which causes diseconomies of scale. 
Economies of Scope. Edwin Mansfield's Applied Microeconomics describes 
economies of scope as economies " ... resulting from the scope rather than 
the scale of the enterprise. They exist where it is less costly to combine two 
or more product lines in one firm than to produce them separately. [Ref. 
11 ]" 
Per Diem Rates. The stabilized daily billing rates applied 365 days per year 
per ship. The per diem rate charged to customers is broken into direct and 
indirect costs. Direct costs are the costs which can be applied to an 
individual ship, usually operation costs. Indirect costs are those which 
cannot be attributed to an individual program. The indirect costs include the 
total costs to run MSC headquarters and area commands. The indirect costs 
are termed 'overhead' by MSC. 
Privatization. "Privatization is the process of changing a public entity or 
enterprise to private control and ownership. It does not include determina-
tions as to whether a support service should be obtained through public or 
12 
private resources, when the Government retains full responsibility and 
control over the delivery of those services. [Ref. 10]" 
Opportunity Cost. An opportunity cost is the value of the alternative 
forsaken for the one selected. It is not the monetary cost, but the cost of 
what has been given up. "The maximum worth of a good or input among 
possible alternative uses. [Ref. 12]" 
Special Mission Ship Sponsors. Department ofDefense(DoD) agencies and 
services with specialized purposes whose missions require ships to perform 
certain operations. 
Transaction Cost. The additional, usually hidden cost, of changing the way 
of doing business. It is a conversion cost. 
13 
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III. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The critical step in conducting a case study is correctly identifying the 
problem. The symptoms of the underlying problem are often cited as the central 
problem. Usually, addressing these symptoms does not deal with the crux of the 
problem. Thus, like weeds, the issues will keep coming back. However, the 
symptoms can help define the true essence of the problem. 
A. PROBLEM SYMPTOMS 
The symptoms which have surfaced at MSC and led to this study are rooted 
primarily in the relationship between MSC and the special mission sponsors. The 
issues identified during this thesis research include: 
• Decision making in MSC is both slow and removed from the sponsor 
• Special mission ship operating requirements are very complex and 
time intensive to satisfy 
• MSC is perceived as a quasi-monopoly by its customers 
• Some sponsors perceive they are paying more than the fair market 
value 
• Some sponsors are attempting to gain operational control of their 
ships 
1. MSC's Infrastructure 
MSC's structure slows decision making and removes it from the problem. 
A large headquarters staff, four area commands, and three field commands (see 
Figure 2) cause long response times for inquiries and decisions. Some responsi-
bilities fall between the cracks. MSC's structure has basically been a classic U-
form organization, formed around business functions. This type of organization 
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requires collaboration across all the directorates within the agency; no one 
directorate can conduct an entire mission independently. Only the Commander of , 
MSC and his top staff have access to multi-functional information and the full 
scope of business transactions. As MSC has grown in size and intricacy, the 
collective direction and coordination has caused the organization to become too 
complex and unresponsive to its customers. The U-form organization is not an 
efficient structure for a large and complicated firm. [Ref. 13] 
There have been instances in which ship sponsors did not receive informa-
tion in a timely manner. Under the old structure, which was in effect until 
February 1996 (the new structure at this time is not fully implemented), no office 
or person was held accountable for a program mission. The staff managing opera-
tion requirements were all located in different departments and in different 
locations. The individuals would report to their functional department heads or 
area commanders; for an individual program there was no clear chain of authority. 
The sponsors dealt with a multitude of contacts and would be required to call 
individuals directly in each department or command for information pertaining to 
their ship(s). Several times sponsors would receive information, such as 
information concerning a flood in an area of a ship, from their on-board staffs days 
before MSC headquarters personnel received word from the port engineer. 
Further, there were often delays to ship contractors in getting decisions 
approved. This would impede the ship's schedule. This was identified in the 
December 1995 GAO/NSAID-96-41 report as one reason contractors tried to 
circumvent the system. The report further stated upper-level management provided 
minimal leadership and the contracting officer's representative had little authority 
to act independently. [Ref. 14] 
These problems indicate a organizational structure unsuited for the mission 
performance requirements. The large unwieldy size and multiple management 
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layers, combined with decentralized accountability for individual programs, strained 
relations between MSC's vendors, customers, and internal directorates. The 
fragmentation and resulting problems were one reason that SMS sponsors perceived 
that they were not getting fair market values for the services being provided. The 
structure is being changed, but, as in any relationship, it will be difficult for MSC 
to regain the full trust of the sponsors that things will be permanently changed for 
the better. 
2. 1984 Implementation of the A 76 Most Efficient Organization (MEO) 
In 1984, MSC was required to compete contractually to operate of the 
special mission ships. First, a cost study was performed detailing the procedures 
for achieving the most efficient organization (MOE). Next, a statement of work 
(SOW) and quality assurance plan were prepared. Using the SOW, an in-house 
cost estimation was done. Then a solicitation of bids was conducted, and finally 
a cost comparison performed. After this process, the oceanographic ship operations 
in the Special Missions Program became commercially contracted-out and MSC 
retained responsibility for contract administration and oversight. The remainder of 
the special mission ships' contracts were awarded to MSC. To win the contracts, 
MSC drastically cut required crew manning levels. [Ref. 4] 
The commercial firms are required to man, operate, and perform mainten-
ance and repairs on the ships including installed equipment. The contractor is 
responsible for providing qualified crew members and staff (port engineers, port 
captains, support staff, etc.) to support the ships. Any crew members working for 
the contractor are referred to as contract-mariners, they are not government 
employees like the civilian mariners who man the MSC operated ships. The 
civilian-mariners are civil service employees. [Ref. 15] 
The contractor must also meet physical and information security 
requirements, and provide and maintain a quality system. The contractor must 
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furnish " ... all necessary personnel, facilities, equipment, consumable supplies, 
provisions, medical equipment, and supplies, services ... " Operating the ships 
includes deck and engineering operations. The contractor is also required to 
provide material support and hotel services to meet sponsor requirements. Other 
specifications include communications, required training, and general administrative 
support. [Ref. 15] 
The in-house contracts have the same SOW requirements. As the SMS 
manager, MSC provides support services to all the ships, contractor-operated and 
MSC operated. These support functions include: type commander responsibilities, 
ship introductions and conversions, life-cycle maintenance, comptroller responsi-
bilities, procurement activities for major purchases such as overhauls, legal counsel, 
training, inspections, mission requirements coordination and management, insurance 
fund for emergencies, world-wide ship support network, and general and adminis-
trative duties. 
Implementing the A76 program compounded the difficulties in managing 
the sponsors' very diverse requirements in the Special Mission Program. The 
smallest program of ships in MSC has the greatest multitude of mission require-
ments. For example, the oceanographic ships do hydraulic, gravity, and magnetic 
surveys and graph the ocean floor. The range ships provide platforms for missile 
range safety and collecting telemetry data. The missile range instrumentation ship 
USNS OBSERVATION ISLAND monitors compliance with strategic arms treaties 
and supports domestic test programs. The missile range instrumentation ship, the 
USNS RANGE SENTINEL, supports Fleet Ballistic Missile flight tests and the 
navigational test vessel USNS VAN GUARD conducts research on navigational 
systems (Strategic Systems Programs Office has plans to combine missions from 
both the VANGUARD and RANGE SENTINEL on one vessel.) There is also a 
cable laying ship and an acoustic research vessel in the Special Missions Program 
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directorate (PM-2). [Ref. 1] With the TAGOs and CHOUEST class ships added 
to the repertoire, the disparate mission taskings increased. 
The SMS program juggles a variety of different missions for a relatively 
small number of ships; the small mission area comprises only about 7% ofMSC's 
total applications of funds [Ref. 16]. The Special Missions Program also has 
civilian mariner operated ships, contractor operated ships and four time-chartered 
ships (the CHOUESTs). Managing special mission ships has become increasingly 
more time intensive. 
By having the various special support ships' missions competing in the A76 
Most Efficient Organization (MEO) program, the program area became too 
complex. It may have been better if the SMSs had been competed as one package 
with the different requirements for each mission spelled out, or all individually 
contacted-out, or if none of the special support ships had been contracted-out. 
Currently, PM-2 has twenty-nine ships handled in three very different ways with 
only 61 people assigned to the program. Furthermore, with both contractor and 
civilian mariner manned ships, PM-2 is using resources for both the contracting 
oversight and civilian mariner requirements. Much like the Fleet Navy, MSC 
handles all aspect of responsibility for their civilian mariners, including pay, 
clearances, training, leave, job assignments, and medical care. MSC is losing what 
economies of scale could be achieved by having all the ships handled in the same 
manner. 
MSC has been accused of poorly managing the oversight of their contractor-
operated ship programs. The GAO, in their December 1995 report, cited several 
contracting oversight problems. Some problems mentioned were in the areas of 
crew-performed repairs, review of subcontract invoices, and oversight of overhaul 
repair work. The GAO mentioned that field level people only checked contractor 
invoices for engineering content, no one verified that the work had been done or 
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the goods received. The report further stated that no one reviewed supporting 
documentation to verify either overtime work or the reports' accuracy. Insufficient 
standardized contract requirements and enforcement procedures were also cited. 
[Ref. 15] 
A potential reason for the contract management problems in the Special 
Mission Program may be attributable to the sudden requirement to implement A76. 
MSC had less then 24 months to follow the A76 procedures and no experience in 
conducting an A 76 cost comparison [Ref. 4]. Since it is virtually impossible to 
cover for all eventualities in a contract, it appears MSC still performs many of ~he 
functions in the same manner as when they were civilian-mariner operated. For 
example, MSC was cited by the GAO for a lack of standard guidelines to develop 
personnel requirements. It was mentioned that MSC's security office processes the 
contractor-operated ships trustworthiness evaluations; this is a function which could 
easily be included as a contractor requirement with MSC 's security office 
conducting compliance oversight. Many ofMSC's SMS contractual problems seem 
to stem from the headquarters and area commands having an over-abundance of 
ship operations responsibilities for both the contractor-operated and in-house 
operated ships. If the SMSs were all contractor-operated and the statements-of-
work included all functions which could be privatized, MSC personnel could 
concentrate their SMS resources on contract management and oversight. 
The A76 mandated cost comparison had a tremendous impact on ship opera-
tions in the Special Mission Program. Unfortunately, no one has thoroughly 
examined whether DoD realized any cost savings or benefits by either commer-
cially operating the oceanographic ships or by modifying those contracts that 
remained in-house. An in-house estimate by MSCLANT estimates: 
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... The Range Instrumentation ships all were under budget all 5 years 
with est of 3.4M dollars. USNS COMFORT was under by an est 
1.5M dollars. The 3 LANT Fleet Tugs have completed 3 years under 
this program with an est 2.7M dollars under budget. [Ref. 17] 
But, no official or complete cost-benefit analysis has been conducted. Table 1 
summarizes the cost comparison conducted on the SMSs, under the A76 program 
[Ref. 18]. The total costs associated with conducting the MEO competition was 
never determined, nor compared against any savings that the program may have 
Table 1. Results of Cost Comparison Under OMB A-76 
Ship Type Number Low MSC Cost Decision Date of 
of Ships Commercial Decision 
Offer 
Tanker 3 $44,915,290 $ 28,518,657 MSC 11-12-82 
Oceanographic 12 89,985,701 114,789,090 Contract 12-12-85 
Hospital 2 14,431,294 8,149,255 MSC 07-02-87 
Cable 5 64,597,225 40,981,142 MSC 10-30-87 
Range Instrumentation 5 52,119,072 33,218,449 MSC 03-08-88 
generated. The A76 program did add more demands on an already time intensive 
mission area. Off-setting cost savings have not been documented. 
3. DBOF Enactment and Severe Budget Cuts Coincided 
DBOF was implemented almost simultaneously with severe DoD budget 
cuts. DBOF raised the ships' per diem rate; budget cuts reduced the ship sponsors' 
budget and encouraged closer cost monitoring. Under DBOF the sponsors should 
theoretically be fully funded for a ship's direct and indirect costs. Unfortunately, 
funds are appropriated at the service level and do not always filter down to the 
smaller mission areas as initially intended. There is tough competition for scarce 
resources within every DoD command. 
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The problem is illustrated in a August 1992 internal memorandum from 
MSC 's comptroller directorate, N8, to its operations directorate, N3. The 
memorandum explains that DoD downsizing made it hard for some special mission 
sponsors to defend their budgeting requirements. In other cases, funding for SMS 
was cut to be used for other programs. The memorandum mentioned that 
NA VSEA was experiencing both of these problems as a result of the high per diem 
rates for the USNS GLOVER and USNS HAYES. [Ref. 19] 
4. MSC as a Quasi Monopoly 
Because MSC is a quasi-monopoly, sponsors believe they have limited 
incentives to control costs. MSC is a government induced monopoly for operating 
the special purpose ships. Thus, MSC is in an auspicious position where they 
could display opportunistic behavior. When a firm can potentially take advantage 
of its customer, whether or not it acts opportunistically, the customer tends to be 
uneasy. [Ref. 13] Sponsors are forced to go through MSC to operate their ships 
and must reimburse MSC for their services. In effect, sponsors give MSC mission 
requirements and then pay the bills for the costs to carry them out. They cannot 
compare costs across providers or rely on the market to keep prices fair. 
5. SMSs' Sponsors Perceive Unfair Per Diem Charges Under DBOF 
The complexities of DBOF has created incertitude in the billing process 
among both sponsors and non-comptroller employees. The lack of standardized 
and publicized per diem rate procedures for the SMSs has further complicated the 
situation. MSC has not formalized the budget analysts overhead allocation method, 
as were the industrial fund budgeting procedures through COMSC Instruction 
7130.1k. 
DoD participants are very low on the DBOF learning curve. DBOF is a 
new method of doing business and a major change which still has many issues to 
iron-out. The March 1995 GAO report (GAO/AIMD-95-79), "Defense Business 
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Operations Fund: Management Issues Challenge Fund Implementation," found that 
DBOF lacks a systematic process to ensure that policies are carried out consistently 
by all the agencies and services. GAO also questioned the accuracy of financial 
reports across DoD. 
One problem associated with DBOF is unstable per diem charges. The 
current policy requires all gains and losses by an agency to be compensated by 
increasing or decreasing DBOF prices to keep the net operating profit zero over 
time. To accomplish this, the annual profit or loss, called the Accumulated 
Operating Result (AOR), is applied to future year prices. This has de-stabilized tpe 
rates for SMSs' sponsors. The AOR causes the actual rates to spike over the years 
as variances are applied to achieve the zero net balance. [Ref. 7] 
FY94 was an extreme example of this rate variance. There was a 50-65% 
increase in some sponsor rates [Ref. 20]. MSC had a positive AOR (i.e., profit) 
in FY 92. The positive AOR for FY92 lowered the FY93 per diem rates. This 
helped generate a positive AOR in FY93 as well. The positive AOR for FY93 was 
to be applied to FY94. However, a NAVCOMPT/OSD policy required excluding 
all prior years' AORs. Thus, the FY94 rates reflected actual costs rather than 
FY93 's artificially low rates. In addition, some sponsor requirements and programs 
changed, causing a significant rate variance for the customers. [Ref. 7] (Note that 
NA VCOMPT mandated the FY94 policy in an effort to fix some problems in 
implementing DBOF procedures in other Navy funds. It should be a one time 
occurrence.) 
In addition, NAVCOMPT can mark a budget item (a line item decrease in 
a budget request) if they believe there is an acceptable risk that all the requested 
money will not be required. For example, suppose they cut Maintenance & Repair 
(M&R) from a budgeted $5 million to a projected $3 million, and the actual cost 
is $4 million. Further suppose that the next fiscal year budget is $5 million. The 
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total budget request, including the $1 million negative AOR, will be $6 million. 
Thus, that years' rate will spike up from the previous year by $3 million. [Ref. 7] 
Of course this process can also work in favor of the customer by preventing them 
form having to pay for emergencies in the year they occur. In effect, it acts as a 
buffer giving them time to request the needed increase. No one complains when 
the rates are lower than the true costs, but NAVCOMPT captures the money and 
it cannot be used for other requirements. DBOF provides cost visibility, but the 
incentives to cut costs must come internally. The real problem for the sponsors is 
the instability the process creates in the rate structure. 
A derivative of this problem is the sponsors' perception that they are paying 
too much for MSC 's services. For one, the sponsors perceive they are paying more 
than their fair share of overhead costs. Most of those interviewed felt they had not 
received an adequate breakdown of what the overhead costs entailed and how the 
allocation was determined. [Ref. 21] MSC allocates overhead to SMSs by first 
surveying directorates and area commands to determine how much time each 
person spends on the SMS program. These figures are translated into total work 
years. SMS's allocation of the total overhead cost is that program's total dedicated 
workyears divided by the total workyears available at MSC for all programs. [Ref. 
7] 
For SMSs, the dollar amount of the program's total overhead cost allocation 
is determined. Those overhead costs which can be attributed to a ship are applied 
to the ship's total expenses. Next, each ship in the program pays a pro-rata share 
of their direct expenses based on their pro-rata share of total direct expenses. This 
overhead cost is then added to the direct operating costs of each ship to derive total 
expense. The example given to the author to clarify this procedure is presented in 
Table 2 [Ref. 7]. 
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This process is not clearly understood by anyone beyond the comptroller 
directorate. Furthermore, since program overhead is determined by pro-rata 
workyears, the process only looks at the labor half of the two-part overhead 
breakdown; it ignores the capital half. Additionally, at the ship level it is not 
always correct to assume the ships with the higher direct operating expenses are the 
most overhead intensive. The USNS HAYES is an example of this point. In 
1994, MSC and NSWC negotiated for operational control of the ship, many 
indirect MSC resources were likely expended on the HAYES while direct operating 
expenses declined. In a April 14, 1994, Draft Naval Oceanographic Office 
Memorandum, "Direct versus MSC Contracting," NA VOCEANO expressed 
concern that its overhead rate had increased from six to almost ten percent. It has 
Table 2. SMS Overhead Allocation 
Suppose total MSC DBOF-N overhead was calculated to be $100,000,000. It was 
determined that the Special Mission Program's share of MSC's total overhead is 13%. PM-
2's dollar share of total overhead equates to 13,000,000 and $3,000,000 of this can be 
directly attributed to specific ships. Therefore, $10,000,000 of the overhead are indirect 
costs. If there are 5 ships in the program the expense breakout would look like this: 
SHIP #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 TOTAL 
TOTAL DIRECT SHIP EXP 10.0 8.5 5.5 15.0 7.0 46.0 
DIRECT OVERHEAD $3M .8 .2 .4 1.0 .6 3.0 
G&A OVERHEAD ($10m x 2.2 1.8 1.2 3.3 1.5 10.0 
PRORATION%) 
TOTAL PER DIEM EXP 13.0 10.5 7.1 19.3 9.1 59.0 
OVERHEAD%(TOTAL 30% 23.5% 29% 28.6% 30% 28.2% 
OH/DIR EXP) 
since increased to 13 percent. [Ref. 22] Every sponsor interviewed believed the 
overhead rate they were paying was excessive, and that they were probably paying 
more than the cost of the resources used in their programs. Whether this is true or 
not, the perception is there. 
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The GAO and some sponsors feel there are inadequate internal cost controls. 
With the multi-layered echelons, there are some duplications of effort. Both the 
headquarters and area commands provide engineering and operations oversight. 
Also, there have been problems in the past with mariner overtime abuses. 
Additionally, funds being held on contingencies have been returned too late to be 
used for other purposes. In May of 1995, the MSC command returned $1.4 million 
dollars to the Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command. It had been held 
for prior-year work orders and was returned too late to be used on other 
requirements. In one instance, 83% of the funds held in contingency were returned. 
This lost buying power is especially detrimental with the reduced budgets everyone 
is scrambling to operate within. [Ref. 23] 
6. Some Sponsors Want Operational Control of their Ships 
. . . firms facing resource dependence must engage in some form of 
organizational elaboration in order to reduce that dependence. [Ref. 
13] 
The customers are reacting in the only way they can to what they perceive 
as opportunistic behavior by MSC: some are trying to get approval to use market 
style competition to lower per diem rates. They are trying to force MSC's hand 
to follow the goal of A76 by creating competition to lower cost and improve 
service. 
Since 1992, the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) has tried to directly 
contract the USNS HAYES. In 1994, the HAYES replaced other vessels which 
were under the operational control ofNSWC's Carderock Division. In a 10 Nov 
1994 Memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare 
Requirements and Assessments), the Director of the Submarine Warfare Division 
of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations requested transferring operational 
control of the HAYES to NSWC citing reduced costs. A Request For Information 
(RFI) revealed that " ... ship operators are available, interested, and at half the cost 
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ofMSC operations." [Ref. 24] The contract cost was on average $698,402 a year 
less than MSC's cost. [Ref. 25] MSC retained control only after MSC and NSWC 
jointly found ways to decrease the ship's direct operating costs. 
In 1994, four new oceanographic ship contracts were awarded to Dyn 
Marine Services of DYNCORP. The total DYNCORP per diem rates for the four 
ships was $37.6K; the per diem charge by MSC was $81K [Ref. 26]. This has led 
NAVOCEANO to request information from other commercial firms. Similarly, in 
their efforts to consolidate the RANGE SENTINEL and VAN GUARD, the 
Strategic Systems Program Office (SSP) received proposals from commercial 
contractors. Finally, on March 30, 1995 the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(Research, Development, and Acquisition) authorized the Commander, Space and 
Naval Warfare Systems Command to release a solicitation for combined operations 
for the USNS ZEUS. [Ref. 27] 
Most of the SMS sponsors have been receiving proposals from outside 
contractors. These proposals indicate that contractors can perform the same 
services as MSC at significantly reduced costs. Affordability is the real driver of 
customer satisfaction. 
B. THE PROBLEM 
Should the special mission ships be centralized under MSC or decentralized 
and full control given to the sponsors? It must be determined whether combining 
SMS operations under a responsible agency is cheaper or more expensive then 
decentralization. The question boils down to what should or should not be 
decentralized to the special mission ships sponsors'. The problem faced by MSC 
and the ships' sponsors is determining where the best interest of the tax payers is 
served for supporting the SMS operations. 
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IV. ALTERNATIVES 
As stated in Chapter II, the four questions addressed in this study are: 
1. Do any economies of scale or economies of scope exist to justify 
centralizing the Special Mission Support Force mission? 
2. Are there any economies of scale or scope that are not being captured 
under the current system? 
3. If there are economies of scale or scope, are they being correctly 
allocated to the sponsors? 
4. What is the optimal allocation of responsibility for the operation of 
special mission ships? 
This chapter addresses the first three questions concerning the existence, realization, 
and distribution of economies of scale and scope in operating SMSs. The central 
issue can be defined as: should the special mission ships stay centralized under 
MSC or should their operation be decentralized to the sponsors' responsibility? 
Chapter V evaluates the alternatives which have been presented and discusses the 
optimal allocation of responsibility as related to the findings. 
When discussing transactions and transaction costs, some economists begin 
by looking at the rational for having both markets and hierarchies. In "The 
Markets and Hierarchies Perspective: Origins, Implications, Prospects," economist 
O.E. Williamson explains the reason both firms and markets exist. Each option 
(firm or market) has the potential to increase efficiency under different 
circumstances. This can be applied to the question of centralizing and 
decentralizing Special Mission Program ships. Centralizing the special purpose 
ships under MSC represents a hierarchical (firm) approach while decentralization 
involves a competitive market approach. Therefore, the problem is whether the 
operations would be better executed within MSC or competed within the market. 
Williamson's model is summarized as follows: 
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The general approach to economic organization employed here can 
be summarized compactly as follows: (1) Markets and firms are 
alternative instruments for completing a related set of transactions; 
(2) whether a set of transactions ought to be executed across markets 
or within a firm depends on the relative efficiency of each mode; (3) 
the costs of writing and executing complex contracts across a market 
vary with the characteristics of the human decision makers who are 
involved with the transaction on the one hand, and the objective 
properties of the market on the other hand; and ( 4) although the· 
human and environmental factors that impede exchanges between 
firms (across a market) manifest themselves somewhat differently 
within the firm, the same set of factors apply to both. [Ref. 28] 
The goal is to evaluate which alternative will yield the taxpayer the highest 
social net benefit. To accomplish this goal, the tangible and intangible benefits and 
costs need to be identified. Ignoring sunk costs, the opportunity costs, interactive 
effects and the transaction costs of each alternative must be examined. The 
alternative which minimizes the total tangible and intangible costs should be the 
one chosen. 
There are three alternatives for the operation of special mission ships: 
1. Centralization. The status quo. 
2. Decentralization. Give operational control to the sponsors. 
3. Centralization with Decentralized Operational Control and 
Modifications. Ensure economies of scale and scope are realized 
and properly allocated. 
A. ASSUMPTIONS 
A cost-benefit analysis was not conducted for the following reasons: 
• There currently is not any actual cost data for decentralized SMS 
operations. 
• The request for information (RFI) proposals received by the 
sponsors are not true gauges of the market costs because they are not 
offering comparable services as those MSC is currently providing. 
30 
• The needs of individual sponsors needs are very different, so it would 
be hard to generalize from a limited number of cases. 
These reasons make a detailed quantitative cost-benefit analysis impossible. This 
case study is a qualitative analysis of the program. It provides an objective forum 
to define the trade-offs of each alternative and evaluate the one which provides the 
most efficiencies. Since it is difficult to measure the benefits and costs in dollars 
or even a common metric, the study is in essence a cost-effectiveness analysis. 
[Ref. 29] 
B. CENTRALIZATION 
Centralization implies one point of accountability. MSC is acting as an agent 
on behalf of the special mission ships sponsors, the principals. The sponsors 
commission MSC to act on their behalf in operating their ships. [Ref. 10] 
1. Provides Economies of Scale and Scope 
Some of the primary reasons to have a centralized structure is to achieve any 
potential economies of scale or scope. As the DoD sealift provider, MSC has a 
great deal of ship operating requirements and skills. Ship operations, whether 
contracted-out or provided in-house, require a great deal of support services as 
mentioned in Chapter III. The SMSs can draw on the potential economies of scope 
of these support services which come with all types of ship operations. The 
economies of scale and scope are derived from the direct and indirect overhead 
support functions provided by MSC. 
a. Economies of Scope 
Economies of scope generate savings by providing a variety of related 
products. With economies of scope, a broad range of services are provided at 
lower total costs relative to producing these items separately. MSC achieves 
several economies of scope for the Special Mission Program, primarily in its 
overhead functions. Potential economies if scope include: 1) ship management, 2) 
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type commander (TYCOM) responsibilities, 3) life cycle maintenance, 4) support-
ing remote operations, and, 6) legal support. These responsibilities all require 
similar activities even though they may be performed for a diverse set of ships and 
missions. This generates economies of scope. 
In ship management, MSC coordinates and tracks all responsibilities in 
operating a Navy ship. Just a few economies of scope involved in the SMS ship 
management include: ship configuration, financial management, scheduled and 
unscheduled maintenance and repair, overhauls, mission requirements and steaming 
schedules, port calls, security, logistics support, and the documentation required for 
all the transactions. In managing a ship, MSC considers its entire life span. 
MSC is the designated TYCOM for service-unique special support ships. 
The agency provides operational oversight, coordination with Fleet CINCs, and 
compliance with: 1) all U.S. Coast Guard/ABS and ISO 9000 standards, 2) Navy 
mandated pollution control, 3) ship conversions and 4) manning and training 
standards [Ref. 30]. 
MSC' s support services include a very through life-cycle maintenance 
program. The program includes lube oil analysis, vibration analysis, predictive/ 
condition indicators and comprehensive engineering standards. The program is 
designed to reduce the life-cycle costs of operating a ship, and secure the best long-
term performance from each vessel. 
Another economy of scope for SMSs is MSC's world-wide ship support 
network. This is extremely valuable to the special mission sponsors because many 
of their missions are in remote locations. MSC can provide emergency spare parts, 
foreign port assistance, and a myriad of other services to ships all over the world. 
U.S. ships are prohibited from having maintenance performed in foreign ports, but 
MSC is able to obtain waivers for SMSs with special needs when the ship cannot 
return to the U.S. in a timely manner. In general, waivers are very difficult to 
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obtain, but they are easier for MSC to obtain because of MSC 's unique position as 
type commander and TRANSCOM component command for strategic sealift. 
MSC also provides its customers legal support in several areas, including: 
maritime, admiralty, environmental, and contract law. This economy of scope is 
quite valuable and probably not fully appreciated by the sponsors. All four legal 
areas are very complex and require expertise in those fields. It would be very 
difficult or costly for a decentralized sponsor to have this legal advice and service 
so readily available. On the other hand, in the long run it could cost the sponsor 
a great deal of money if they do not have experts in maritime, admiralty, 
environmental, and contract law reviewing potential contracts and actions, and 
investigating possible claims. 
b. Economies of Scale 
Economies of scale occur when prices decrease as larger quantities of 
similar products are produced. MSC's PM-2 sponsors also gain economies of scale 
through MSC 's overhead functions, particularly contract administration and 
management, and an insurance fund. 
MSC 's contract administration and management services include the 
contract award process, and monitoring and enforcing the contracts. More 
economies of scale are realized in the credibility of contract fulfillment by a 
known and experienced maritime agency. If each sponsor had control of their 
ship( s) they would all be required to have contract personnel with expert 
knowledge in ship operations. Another advantage to having a consolidated contract 
management office for special purpose ships is that it provides MSC more 
bargaining and enforcement power than a lone sponsor would have with 
commercial firms. 
In addition, MSC provides SMSs an insurance policy to cover any 
unforeseen emergencies. Unforeseen repairs or accidents are very costly. MSC 
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maintains reserves for claims and accidents. MSC provides a safety net to its 
customers with a special fund to cover large unexpected emergency expenses. The 
sponsor receives time to request the appropriate funding from Congress without 
having to delay repairs longer than necessary. This can really help return the ship 
to operations as fast as possible. Like most insurance programs, it is less costly to 
provide on a larger scale. 
2. Synergy of Expertise 
MSC personnel and directorates have a synergy of expertise developed from 
extensive ship management experience. MSC is very high on the learning curve 
in all fields of ships operations, including: engineering, life cycle maintenance, 
manning and scheduling. The wealth of knowledge at MSC and the organization's 
reliance on shared information and data across all programs is critical to successful 
ship operations. The resources available to the PM-2 program manager enhances 
control over the ships. This expertise would be almost impossible for a customer 
to replicate. 
3. Transaction Costs 
There are transactions costs associated with decentralizing control to the 
sponsors. If the sponsor contracts out all aspects of ship operations they will need 
a very knowledgeable contract staff, and must be very careful to safeguar~ against 
contractual omissions and ambiguities. In a similar case, a study of public and 
private transit systems by James L. Perry and Timlynn T. Babitsky found no 
evidence that private contractors could manage public systems better than 
government workers. They found private contractors had only limited interests in 
increasing efficiencies and " ... the provisions built into management contracts 
generally failed to give private managers adequate incentives to control costs." 
[Ref. 10] 
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Jay Barney and William Ouchi state that when there are few potential firms 
in a market, the costs of trying to achieve market competition are excessive: 
The existence of a small number of parties to an exchange increases 
the likelihood of opportunistic behavior, just as the existence of 
uncertainty/complexity makes bounded rationality operative, thus 
making it impossible for parties to an exchange to anticipate all 
possible future states in their relations. In such a setting, the costs of 
writing and enforcing a contract assuring all parties to an exchange 
of an outcome that all would deem as fair are high enough to be 
prohibitive. In this situation, a market would be an inefficient means 
of carrying forward a transaction, and it will be replaced by a 
hierarchy. [Ref. 13] 
Currently, there are very few firms able to conduct ship operations for special 
purpose ships. Under these circumstances, decentralizing PM-2 would be cost 
prohibitive and inefficient. 
SMS sponsors probably do not have enough information to accurately write 
contract specifications. In "The Market for 'Lemons:' Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism" by George A. Akerlof, defines asymmetric information as 
information possessed by one party that the other cannot get without paying a very 
high cost and not until the exchange is complete [Ref. 31]. This concept can be 
applied to the special mission sponsors. They can not accurately access the total 
requirements of operating their own ships until after they have contacted them out. 
_It is virtually impossible to specify a ship's operation contract in such detail that 
it will cover all eventualities. There is simply not enough information to precisely 
account for all contingencies in the transaction and the actual costs incurred. 
Centralizing control in MSC internalizes the information asymmetries. 
C. DECENTRALIZATION 
A competitive setting usually offers the greatest chance of getting the lowest 
price and the best service. Competition provides strong incentives for firms to 
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increase quality and minimize costs. When a situation is monopolistic, the 
potential exists for excessive costs and prices, and lower quality and productivity. 
This is why the SMS sponsors want to privatize. [Ref. 28] 
1. Cost Savings 
Decentralizing the special mission functions will allow each sponsor to 
exploit fair market competition in areas such as ship costs and service quality. The 
economist Paul Rubin put it succinctly, "market incentives for efficiency and low-
cost production are the most powerful incentives available." [Ref. 29] 
In Competition in Government-Financed Services, John Hilkes claims that 
a government monopoly introduces two costs resulting from the lack of 
competition: 1) allocative inefficiency costs and 2) production inefficiency costs. 
Allocative inefficiencies happen when prices are too high and output is lower than 
if there was competition. This causes the customers to be dissatisfied because they 
feel they are paying more for a product than its worth. Production inefficiencies 
occurs when more inputs are used than required causing higher prices. Hilkes 
believes in-house government operations run inefficiently without competition. 
With government monopolies, costs are not as obvious or relevant as in the private 
sector. There are few incentives to minimize costs. [Ref. 32] Competition with 
private providers under the A 7 6 program appears to have been a one time 
occurrence for SMSs. Furthermore, when it was implemented it did not look at 
decentralizing the ships' control. Therefore, MSC 's control over SMS is currently 
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viewed by the sponsors as a monopoly. Privatizing the special mission platforms 
would presumably help eliminate the allocative and productive inefficiencies. 
Alleviating allocative and productive inefficiencies, through decentralization 
can help reduce per diem rates. For example, in 1993 BT Marine (BTM) 
submitted an unsolicited proposal to SPA WARs for the combined technical support 
and operations of two ships for $26 million; this represented a savings of 
approximately 40 percent over MSC's projected per diem rate for the two ships 
[Ref. 20]. Most Special Mission Program sponsors received unsolicited proposals 
from contractors which offered greatly reduced total operating costs. With the 
major budget cuts, sponsors have a higher sensitivity to rate changes. The reduced 
rate structures may enable sponsors to better meet mission requirements. The 
problem is the contracts do not include the full range of overhead support services 
provided by MSC. It is very difficult to predict the cost of reproducing these 
functions at the sponsor level. Therefore, because the contractor rates do not 
include all the support functions provided by MSC, per diem charges are not a fair 
comparison between MSC and the contractor. 
2. Autonomy and Flexibility 
Decentralization will provide the sponsors both autonomy and flexibility, a 
major advantage in such a dynamic climate. SMSs missions are extremely 
diversified and the requirements have a much higher degree of variability than any 
other program area. Privatization will cut through the many layers of bureaucracy 
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at MSC. Moreover, the platform sponsors will have the flexibility to combine 
operations and technical support contracts. 
3. Ownership 
The A76 implementation cost only compared MSC oversight and 
contracting-out, not decentralizing operations to the sponsors. Without considering 
this third option, some value of fair market competition was lost. Additionally, 
when the cost proposals were submitted, the government needed to only include 
those personnel costs which were: 
... associated with direct supervisory positions one level higher than 
that activity under review and, administrative support positions which 
would be completely eliminated if the function were contracted out. 
Commercial offers generally include a full proportionate share of 
their overhead burden in order to recover the costs of doing business. 
[Ref. 4] 
Thus the cost of operating the civilian mariner pool, almost every administrative 
MSC support directorate, and any other overhead cost which was used by more 
than the special mission ships was not included in MSC's proposal. 
Conversely, commercial bids did not include maintenance performed by the 
ships' crews or operating costs for what the commercial operators deemed 
unnecessary departments. Only the required industry or Coast Guard minimums 
for manning were factored into proposals. [Ref. 4] 
By gaining full ownership of their missions, sponsors will gain a great deal 
from productivity and efficiency improvements brought on by privatization. 
Because it is monopolistic, MSC has weakened accountability, less pressure for 
efficiency, and a reduced incentive for cost control [Ref. 10]. Moreover, 
application of the A76 program complicated the management of SMSs 
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counteracting many of the economies achieved through centralization. 
Furthermore, the sponsors do not necessarily have to give-up all the economies of 
scope and scale they received from MSC. Under DBOF it is possible for them to 
contract with MSC for specific purposes [Ref. 33]. 
D. CENTRALIZATION WITH DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONAL 
CONTROL AND MODIFICATIONS 
Centralizing the SMSs operations provides the sponsors benefits from 
economies of scale and scope along while maintaining the synergy of expertise. 
By adding three modifications most of the issues discussed in chapter III will be 
addressed. These modifications are: 1) commercially contract-out special mission 
ship operations, 2) make some internal management improvements, and 3) once 
again fund overhead costs by appropriations. 
1. Commercially Contract-Out all SMS Operations 
To secure cost savings through competition, all special mission ships 
operations could be contracted-out while simultaneously centralizing all overhead 
support functions under MSC to retain the scale and scope economies. 
Privatization in general saves money. A 1987 U.S. Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) report, which analyzed the cost savings from the A-76 program, found an 
average savings of over 35% for DoD functions which were contractedo.ut and a 
cost savings of at least 20% for the functions which remained in-house [Ref. 32]. 
Table 3 shows the unadjusted data for the cost savings that CBO found for the 
years 1984 through 1986. Commercially contracting-out all direct ships operations 
could potentially save money. 
Privatizing all the ship operations would also streamline the necessary 
controls and oversight issues required to manage the ships' operational require-
ments. Instead of having some ships civilian-mariner operated and some 
contractor-mariner operated, all would be contractor-operated (the time-chartered 
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CHOUEST ships were not considered here because they have only recently been 
Table 3. DoD Cost Reductions from Contracting-Out Under A 76 
1984 1985 1986 
Average Savings 41% 38% 38% 
from Contracting 
Average Savings from 22% 20% 23% 
Internal Management 
Improvement 
placed under the SMS program). Thus, PM-2 would not have to operate under two 
very diverse set of rules and regulations. Also, contracting-out the whole program 
will decrease the program's overhead resources, such as the manning and crew 
requirements activities. 
2. Internal Management Improvements 
The change in organization structure from function oriented to program 
management oriented will help provide the economies of scale and scope which are 
currently not being realized or not being correctly allocated. A program 
management organization roughly correlates to an M-form organization. An M-
form organization consists of partially diversified business divisions with shared 
resources and synergism between divisions. The new structure will, hopefully, 
expedite decision-making and provide a point of accountability. [Ref. 13] 
3. Overhead Costs Funded through Appropriations 
DBOF was established to help managers reduce costs by providing cost 
visibility. DBOF combined the Stock Fund and Industrial Fund. When these funds 
were separate accounts, activities were often more worried about cash than cost. 
Money could not be transferred from one fund to the other, so activities and 
options were determined on the basis of which fund had cash available rather than 
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on cost. DBOF combined the two funds into one pot of money so the customer 
could choose the low cost alternative. Under DBOF, activities recover their costs 
from their customers. Since the customers pay for the services, they will want to 
buy the less expensive alternative. [Ref. 33] 
MSC does not operate like a typical DBOF activity. The customers paid 
for their direct costs before DBOF was implemented. These costs are more directly 
comparable to the private contractors' proposals for ship operations. DBOF added 
the indirect costs to MSC's per diem rates. The customer doesn't have any control 
over overhead costs. Furthermore, these costs are not typically included in the 
private contractors proposals. Therefore, DBOF distorts the sponsors comparison 
between centralization under DBOF and decentralization. With overhead costs paid 
under an appropriations fund, the Commander of MSC would still have cost visi-
bility of internal costs, enabling cost management and cost reduction. Budget 
constraints make all DoD agencies very concerned with controlling all costs, 
including overhead; MSC is no exception. 
Another problem DBOF has caused at MSC is tremendous variability in the 
rates charged to the special mission sponsors. With unstable rates which vary from 
the projected rates, the small platforms are not always guaranteed full reimburse-
ment when the rates spike. Most SMS sponsors' programs are not at the level of 
visibility to have their services bring SMS's budget overruns brought to Congress. 
Reverting back to customers paying for direct expenses only and MSC having 
appropriated funds for indirect costs, will maintain equity in MSC 's rate structure, 




V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTENT 
This thesis examined whether centralizing or decentralizing the Special 
Mission Program would provide the best value to the tax payer. The goal was first 
to define the motivation for examining the options of centralizing or decentralizing 
the management of special mission ships. After identifying the issues, the next step 
evaluated which alternative yield the highest net benefit. In order to do so, the 
tangible and intangible benefits and costs of each alternative were identified. The 
alternative which minimizes the total tangible and intangible costs should be the 
one chosen. To evaluate the alternatives, the thesis addressed several research 
questions: 
1. Do any economies of scale or economies of scope exist to justify the 
centralizing of the Special Mission Support Force mission? 
2. Are there any economies of scale or scope that are not being captured 
under the current system? 
3. If there are economies of scale or scope, are they being correctly 
allocated to the sponsors? 
4. What is the optimal allocation of responsibility for the operation of 
special mission ships? 
B. RECOMMENDATION 
The three alternatives presented for operating special mission ships include: 
1. Centralization. The status quo. 
2. Decentralization. Give operational control to the sponsors. 
3. Centralization with Decentralized Operational Control and 
Modifications. Ensure economies of scale and scope are realized 
and properly allocated. 
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The preferred recommendation is: 
Centralization with Modifications. 
1. Commercially contract-out all SMS operations 
2. Improve internal management functions 
3. Fund overhead costs through direct appropriations 
The modifications to the current organization will resolve many of the factors 
driving the SMS sponsors towards contracting through the option of market 
competition. When discussing the causes and consequences of resource dependent 
relations between economic actors the book Organizational Economics states: 
... Because firms are constrained in this manner, it may be possible to 
observe exchange relations characterized by high resource dependence 
that are very stable and efficient over time, in which relatively little 
exploitation of exchange partners takes place.... The arguments of 
organizational economics also suggests that interpersonal relations can 
help resolve problems of opportunism associated with resource 
dependence. [Ref. 13] 
MSC 's previous structure did not allow the sponsors and MSC staff to 
cooperatively obtain all the benefits from the scale and scope economies realized 
by centralizing the SMSs operations. The re-invention has great potential for 
correcting this shortcoming by changing from a stove-pipe, unresponsive U-form 
organization to the more customer focused and accountable M-form organization. 
The new structure is on the right path. This evolution could be enhanced by 
streamlining the oversight requirements. To streamline oversight, MSC could 
contract-out the PM-2 ships. It would also help if indirect costs were again 
covered by appropriated funds. These two modifications could greatly improve the 
total net benefits realized by the Special Mission Program. 
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C. ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS 
If overhead is not funded through appropriations, MSC needs to educate 
staff and customers about the DBOF processes. Only the comptroller directorate 
(N8) comprehensively understands the customer billing procedures. DBOF itself 
is a new way for the government to do business. Variance can be attributed to the 
learning curve and to the problems in the system. Almost any major change will 
go through a rough period before it can be smoothed out. The severe budget cuts 
in conjunction with DBOF's growing pains have greatly contributed to the 
sponsors' desires to directly control their ships. The customers need to be 
informed buyers to remove their doubts. 
Reports should also be standardized and terminology simplified so the non-
budget analyst can easily understand where costs are derived and why variances 
occur. Likewise, cost accountability down to the ship operations level would 
improve incentives to control costs. Lastly, better communication is vital both 
between MSC and the sponsor and within MSC. Implementing the new program 
management organization is a good start toward providing better communication, 
both externally and internally. If manpower constraints permit, a central point of 
contact to field sponsors' questions, would help restore the confidence lost in the 
past. 
D. FURTHER AREAS OF RESEARCH 
Some suggested follow-on studies are: 
• A cost-benefit analysis of SPA WAR's USNS ZEUS after sufficient 
time has elapsed. A cost-benefit analysis should compare the 
ZEUS's direct and indirect costs when it was under MSC's control 
and after it has been privatized under SPAWAR's control. This 
quantitative analysis could serve as a yard stick for evaluating the 
centralization/decentralization question. 
• A case study to determine if the estimated cost-savings for 
contracting-out oceanographic ships under the A-76 program were 
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realized. Similarly, actual cost savings should be verified for those 
A76 programs retained in-house, were the projected savings realized. 
• The general and administrative costs in MSC headquarters, area 
commands, and field activities should be examined. Can operations 
be conducted more efficiently to cut costs? 
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